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Unequal spatial distribution of retrofits in Bucharest’s apartment buildings
Catalina Turcu
Bartlett School of the Built Environment, School of Planning, University College London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the current spatial patterns of energy retrofits in post-socialist apartment
buildings are unequally distributed across municipalities in Bucharest, Romania. In addition to
the dominant techno-economic and social framing of this type of retrofit action, an institutional
and political perspective can provide useful insights into why this occurs. By drawing on
secondary analysis of statistical data, grey literature and 20 semi-structured interviews in
Bucharest, three important findings emerge. First, the institutional complexity of energy retrofit
of apartment buildings in Romania is underestimated and the interaction between various
institutions is poor, explained by lack of trust and collective action. Second, the spatial
distribution of the retrofit of apartment buildings is unequally distributed across Bucharest’s six
municipalities. Third, current action for retrofit does not reach municipalities with the greatest
need and potential. A more bottom-up and decentralized institutional landscape exists than is
currently acknowledged in public policy and the research literature. Findings show an unequal
and unfair spread of retrofit action within and between cities – raising wider implications for the
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Introduction
The importance of energy efficiency in buildings is
rapidly emerging in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE),1 fuelled by the urgent need to respond to climate
change and the ensuing European policy and regulation,
but also by the legacy of long-term neglect of the built
environment. Buildings are responsible for 40% of Eur-
ope’s total energy demand, and energy-efficiency
measures can save up to 17% of that by 2050 (EC,
2006). In turn, residential buildings comprise the biggest
segment of the European Union’s (EU) heated building
stock (75%) and, thus, are responsible for most of the
sector’s energy consumption, with a 68% share of that
in 2009. This can be reduced by 41.5% via various build-
ing retrofit2 measures (EC, 2006). However, the current
European building retrofit trends do not look encoura-
ging: only 1.2% of the existing stock is renovated every
year compared with a 2–3% yearly rate needed to meet
the 80% target by 2050 (Renovate Europe, 2014).
The CEE’s residential sector is highly dependent on fos-
sil fuel energy: coal (41%), gas (7%) and oil (3%) (BPIE,
2011, p. 10). In addition, 83% of its buildings were built
during the socialist regimes between 1960 and 1990
(BPIE, 2011, p. 9), when the mass production of large-
scale prefabricated housing estates, the so-called apart-
ment buildings,3 was the norm and the original building
regulations were lenient in terms of energy efficiency.
Only small parts of this stock have been retrofitted so
far, and so most of it has low energy performance; dated
and poorly performing electricity, heating, water and
waste systems; and major structural problems. The retrofit
of the post-socialist housing is, thus, one of the largest pro-
blems facing municipalities in the CEE (UNECE, 2013).
An estimated 100 million people across the CEE still
live in these buildings, in approximately 34 million apart-
ments (IIASA, 2012). EU directives, such as the Energy
Performance in Buildings Directive (EPBD) and Energy
Efficiency Directive (EED), require CEE countries to
reduce energy consumption in this type of housing. This
is done through national programmes and initiatives
including the programme for ‘Thermal Rehabilitation of
Apartment Buildings’ in Romania; ‘PANEL’ and ‘Green
Saving’ in the Czech Republic; ‘Renovation of Apartment
Buildings’ in Estonia; ‘Renovation of Prefabricated-Panel
Residences’ in Hungary; and ‘Thermal Modernisation
andRenovation’ in Poland. There is wide consensus within
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the EU that building energy retrofit (hereafter, referred to
as retrofit) has multiple benefits, e.g., enhanced living con-
ditions and reduced energy bills, reductions in fuel poverty
and mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while
creating employment. These co-benefits are increasingly
employed to justify climate change investment (Bouzar-
ovski & Herrero, 2015).
The evidence for establishing how many apartment
buildings have been retrofitted across the CEE is difficult
to compile. For example, of 80,000 eligible apartment
buildings in Romania, even the most positive estimates
did not exceed 3000 (a mere 4%) being retrofitted by
2009 (Pasztor & Peter, 2009). At this pace, it would take
Romania 120 years to retrofit all its apartment buildings
(Liga Habitat, 2010). Other reports suggest that 360,000
apartments have been retrofitted in the Czech Republic,
the equivalent of 16% of the total of 2.2 million apartments
requiring retrofit (OECD, 2011); 190,000 apartments in
Hungary (EC, 2008); and 350 apartment buildings and
11,000 apartments in Estonia (Arup, 2013). Some of
these data are outdated; however, progress over the last
five years has been reported as being slow bymany reports.
The explanation for this is twofold. First, there is a techno-
economic explanation. CEE countries do not access
enough of the EU’s building retrofit-earmarked funding.
This has been a direct consequence of the recent economic
downturn, which has impacted on citizens’ purchasing
power and the CEE countries’ ability to match funding
and provide suitable financial frameworks, but also econ-
omic capital to deliver technological development and
innovation (EC, 2012; EuroACE, 2009; McKinsey, 2010).
Lack of access to ‘finance’ is perceived as a main barrier
to roll out ‘renovation trains’ across Europe (Rovers, 2014).
Second, the recent literature suggests that retrofit pro-
grammes fail to attract enough apartment owners,
despite their generous terms. This is partly related to
the characteristics of this type of housing which has
seen mass privatization and the emergence of ‘super
homeownership’ throughout the 1990s. This entailed
transferring the ownership of the apartments to individ-
ual households while the ownership of common parts
and land remained unclear. Additionally, the region’s
social capital remains weak (Raiser, Haerpfer, Noworthy,
& Wallace, 2001) and the recent impoverishment of
homeowners has reduced their ability to invest in their
homes. Thus, the social aspects of retrofit is slowly gain-
ing momentum within the region’s political and aca-
demic circles (Bouzarovski, Salukvadze, & Gentile,
2011 Cirman, Mandič, Zorić, Cirman, & Mandič, 2013;
Djourdjin & Yotova, 2004; Gram-Hanssen, 2014; Schwe-
ber & Leiringer, 2012; Vlasova & Gram-Hanssen, 2014).
Two other observations point to a third possible
explanation of an institutional–political nature which is
not extensively developed in the literature. First, some
studies highlight the role that institutions play in shaping
retrofit processes in the CEE, including a bias towards
large-scale, top-down financing institutions; the complex
institutional settings; and unclear post-1990 manage-
ment of apartment buildings. They also note the central-
ity of local government in delivery, and the ‘rigidity’ of
municipal institutions in adopting new energy-efficiency
frameworks, technologies and financial mechanisms
(Altmann, 2013; BPIE, 2011; EC, 2013; UNECE, 2013).
Also, the literature notes the importance of stakeholders
and institutions in developing and implementing sus-
tainable building practices (Feige, Wallbaum, & Krank,
2011; Klinckenberg Consultants, 2010). However, there
is little mapping of the institutions for retrofit at different
levels and little discussion of institutional interaction.
This raises the paper’s first research question:
What are the institutions for energy retrofit of apart-
ment buildings and how do they interact?
Second, CEE countries struggle against and overcome simi-
lar challenges across their national territories. This includes
the legacy of central planning, socialist architecture, and
the cost of social and economic change. They also share
similar physical conditions (prefabrication, large-scale
buildings, ageing and deterioration etc.) and socio-econ-
omic conditions (i.e., lack of finance, super-homeowner-
ship, lack of socio-economic polarization etc.) for this
type of housing. However, there is significant variation in
the delivery of housing retrofit between countries (BPIE,
2011; Klinckenberg Consultants, 2010). For example, Ste-
fan Buzarovski’s work examines energy transitions/retro-
fitting and subsequent variation between European/CEE
countries through the lens of energy vulnerability,
especially in relation to household energy poverty and
deprivation (Bouzarovski, 2014; Bouzarovski & Herrero,
2015; Buzar, 2007). Lankina, Hudalla, and Wollmann
(2008) consider within-country variation inmunicipal per-
formance in the CEE, explained not only by structural fac-
tors but also by institutional–cultural–political factors. In
fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that in Bucharest, Roma-
nia, the delivery of retrofit in apartment buildings is uneven
across its six municipalities, i.e., some have retrofittedmost
of their housing stock, others very little (Ungureanu, 2014;
Vrabie, 2014). This raises three research questions that are
addressed in this paper:
. What are the spatial patterns of energy retrofit of
apartment buildings at the municipal level in
Bucharest?
. Why does spatial inequality in delivery occur (i.e.,
what are the factors that explain, produce and re-
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produce current patterns of energy retrofit of apart-
ment buildings in Bucharest?)
. Does current action for the energy retrofit of apart-
ment buildings in Bucharest reach to the municipali-
ties with the highest need and potential?
By answering these questions, three important con-
tributions are made. First, the institutional complexity
of energy retrofit of apartment buildings in Romania
is underestimated and the interaction between various
institutions is poor, explained by lack of trust and col-
lective action. It is argued this impacts on the insti-
tutional design and good governance of retrofit
action. Second, the spatial distribution of retrofit of
apartment buildings is unequally distributed across
Bucharest’s six municipalities. Third, municipalities
with specific characteristics are better performers and
take most of the public funding. (These characteristics
are shown to be strong municipal leadership, compara-
tively wealthier municipalities, municipalities with a
smaller and ‘easier’ stock to retrofit.) Thus, current ret-
rofit action in Bucharest and Romania does not reach
municipalities with the highest need and potential for
housing retrofit. These findings have wider impli-
cations for the potential shortcomings of energy-effi-
ciency initiatives in the CEE and the EU. They also
suggest the possibility of an unequal (and unfair)
spread of energy-retrofit funding and action within
and between cities, which might occur in other CEE
countries.
This paper also puts forward an original theoretical
contribution. It provides a basis for understanding the
retrofit of housing through the lens of an institutional
analysis, drawing on different classifications of insti-
tutions, their interaction and the effect that these have
on the energy retrofit performance at the local level.
This is linked to a wider discussion of local performance
and unequal spatial development in post-socialist
Europe. First-hand empirical data from Bucharest are
used to describe current retrofit practice of apartment
buildings.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a discussion
of what determines municipal performance at the urban
level is undertaken, with a specific focus on institutions
and the CEE. Second, findings are presented using as a
case study the National Programme for the Thermal
Rehabilitation of Apartment Buildings in Bucharest.
Finally, the institutional framework for the retrofit of
apartment buildings is considered, particularly the vari-
ation in municipal performance in Bucharest. Wider les-
sons are drawn for the retrofit of apartment buildings
and the policy implications for energy efficiency build-
ings in the CEE.
What determines local performance
The literature discusses what generally influences urban
performance at the local level.4 Moreover, recent
research argues that in some CEE countries, despite rela-
tively similar socio-economic and institutional frame-
works, there is significant within-country variation in
municipal performance (Lankina et al., 2008; Turcu &
Tosics, 2015). How can this be explained? Three types
of explanations are advanced: structural factors, local
‘politics’ and institutions.
Most studies argue that structural aspects matter.
These include a city’s geographical location, and econ-
omic, social and institutional capacity. For example,
proximity to good road and transport infrastructure is
important. Studies have also looked at the ‘civilizational
division’ and argued that social capacity is inexistent or
weaker in East than West (Aberg & Sandberg, 2003; Rai-
ser et al., 2001), and more Western locations are more
likely to leap-frog transition steps due to Western influ-
ence (Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). The size of local econom-
ies and financial resources are also important. Large
economic engines are more likely to enhance a city’s
economic performance by providing employment and
other economic benefits. This is particularly relevant
for the CEE where whole cities were established around
industrial activity (Lankina et al., 2008).
Lankina et al. (2008), however, argue that not only
structural ‘givens’ but also political factors and cultural
traditions can explain variation in local performance in
a CEE context. For them, local performance is a function
of political and civil society actors that influence local
governance processes (Lankina et al., 2008). Political fac-
tors such as the political affiliation of municipal govern-
ment can determine resource allocation and change
policy priorities when power changes hands, while politi-
cal stability and local leadership, such as mayoral support
and political prioritization, can drive better local per-
formance and long-term planning.
Institutions have received a great deal of attention,
especially in political and economic geography studies
where they are seen as a key variation factor for urban
performance (OECD, 2012; Tomaney, 2013). For
North (2005), institutions are the ‘scaffolding that
shape human interaction’ (p. 48) and ‘the rules of the
game in a society’ (North, 2005, p. 48), where human
interaction can be shaped by ‘formal constraints – such
as rules that human beings devise – and informal con-
straints – such as conventions and codes of behavior’
(p. 4). This definition acknowledges a diversity of insti-
tutions that can be driven by clearly defined rules, but
also by politics and norms, which are less clear and deter-
mine whose rules matters.
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Formal versus informal institutions: interaction
and trust
The distinction between formal and informal institutions
draws on North’s (1990) discussion of formal–informal
constraints which frame human interaction. Formal
institutions are defined by clearly laid rules, policy
dependent and driven by legislators, judges, markets,
bureaucrats and other rule-makers (Pejovich, 1999).
Informal institutions, in turn, refer to implicit and
socially derived understandings including customs, tra-
ditions, religious beliefs, routines and norms that have
endured the test of time. While formal institutions are
related to the ‘top’, to legal or state power dynamics,
informal ones strive to establish parallel areas of compe-
tence and influence legal and state power dynamics from
the ‘bottom’ (Lauth, 2000).
Formal and informal institutions have mostly been
analyzed independently. However, their interaction is
also important. Farole, Rodriguez-Pose, & Storper,
(2011) argue that the interaction between formal and
informal institutions determines the process of economic
growth, also argued by Pejovich (1999) in his ‘interaction
thesis’; while Platje (2008) notes the importance of ‘insti-
tutional equilibrium’ between informal and formal insti-
tutions, attained on the basis of reciprocal trust, which
sits at the basis of a sustainable institutional design.
This is similar to the notion of institutional ‘congruence’,
whereby no matter how good formal institutions are,
they can be ineffective if they are not supported by the
informal institutions such as wider society cultural pat-
terns and existing social capital capacity (Lankina et al.,
2008).
Institutions in the CEE is a complex and emergent
area of research and has mainly focused on institutional
change from a macro-societal perspective (Mihaylova,
2004), but also on differences between countries in
local institution building (Lankina et al., 2008). Existing
research focuses mainly on formal institutions and less
on their informal counterparts, which, some argue, has
led to a distorted understanding of post-socialist insti-
tutional change pathways (Matthiesen, 2002). Post-
1990 formal institutions are not seen as interacting
with prevailing informal institutions and this, it has
been argued, plays a major role in delaying the transition
from socialism to capitalism (Pejovich, 1999).
Limited trust in formal institutions is seen as a main
cause of this and understanding how to change it could
foster further development in the region (Raiser et al.,
2001). The socialist state discouraged free associations
of people and replaced them by ‘forced’ ones (Nichols,
1996), which led in turn to a generalized state of social
distrust and cynicism in institutions difficult to reverse
(Lovell, 2001; Raiser, 2003). Institutional trust is seen
as an expectation of fair treatment and low levels of
trust as well as public sector corruption can have a sig-
nificant effect on institutional trust (Miller, Koshechkina,
& Grodeland, 1997).
Hard versus soft institutions: interaction and
collective action
The debate around hard and soft institutions is rooted in
planning and governance studies and draws on Healey’s
work on collaborative planning and institutional
capacity. Healey (1997) notes that urban governance
processes should be interactive and involve various insti-
tutions. She argues that in governing urban processes
attention should be paid to institutional structures at
two levels and outlines a ‘structure of challenges’ in the
interaction between hard infrastructure (such as city-
and nationwide agencies or institutions) and soft infra-
structure (such as neighbourhood-based and/or civil
society groups).
The integration between hard and soft institutions is
key to sustainable institutional design and good urban
governance. Building on this, Healey argues that improv-
ing urban areas depends on the ‘quality of governance’
or institutional capacity frameworks in those areas
because:
Some are well integrated, well connected, and well
informed, and can mobilize readily to act to capture
opportunities and enhance local conditions. Others are
fragmented; lack the connections to sources of power
and knowledge, and the mobilization capacity, to
organize to make a difference.
(Healey, 1998, p. 1531)
The quality of governance, thus, depends on the agency
involvement with various types of institutions and can be
seen as an urban area’s ability to act as a collective actor,
which in turn determines its future in economic, social
and environmental terms (Healey, Cars, Madanipour,
& De Magalhaes, 2002). In other words, collective action
is the gel for interaction between hard and soft insti-
tutions and determines good governance; lack of it, in
turn, leads to poorly governed urban processes. This
points to the link between institutions and collective
action as a manifestation of social capital, which has
been discussed at length in relation to the transition
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ and the democratiza-
tion of traditional government. For example, Gualini
(2002) argues institution building is an issue of collective
action that is catalyzed at the interface between agency
and structures and which is the result of incremental,
self-transforming and self-policing processes.
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However, the role played by collective action in creat-
ing institutional capital, and subsequently good govern-
ance processes, can be questionable on three accounts
when the focus of this paper is considered. First, the lit-
erature is generally sceptical about the role that collective
action can play in achieving institutional capital to deli-
ver better environmental policy goals (i.e., energy retro-
fit), as these are too wide to allow for a clear image of
costs and benefits associated with them and the likeli-
hood to influence outcomes, but also require certain
levels of knowledge (Rydin & Pennington, 2000).
Second, CEE is perceived as having weak social capi-
tal, and so potential for collective action (Aberg & Sand-
berg, 2003; Raiser et al., 2001). This is related to previous
socialist discourses of collectivism and egalitarianism.
Pejovich (1999) interestingly argues that the ethos of col-
lectivism and egalitarianism in the CEE differs from that
of classical liberalism in the Western world. In other
words, individuals in the CEE do not expect to interact
with others to pursue a common and equal end. In con-
trast, in Western Europe individuals interact with others
in the pursuit of their private ends.
Finally, there seems to be an interaction problem in
the CEE countries between hard and soft institutions,
which in turn bear an impact on the quality of govern-
ance processes. Hard institutions are interacting and
relatively successful, but this happens largely outside
people’s everyday lives; hence, there is a mismatch
between the city- and/or nationwide institutions and
those claimed by citizens and civil society at the local
level which fosters distrust and undermines the quality
of governance processes (Matthiesen, 2002).
Case study
Romania has an estimated 8.2 m dwellings (National
Institute of Statistics, 2011). Of these, approximately
40% (3.2 m) are situated in urban areas (BPIE, 2012).
A total of 72% (2.3 m) of dwellings in urban areas are
situated in large apartment buildings, averaging 40 apart-
ments per building; over 60% of apartment buildings are
four storeys high, while 16% are 10 storeys high (BPIE,
2014). A total of 37.3% of Romanians live in apartment
buildings compared with Latvia (70% of the population)
and Estonia (25% of the population) (BPIE, 2011). A
total of 98.2% of apartments in Romania are privately
owned and only 1.5% publicly owned (National Institute
of Statistics, 2011). There are 109,194 buildings with pri-
vately owned apartments in Romania (National Institute
of Statistics, 2011), managed and administrated by con-
dominium associations. Their energy performance is
poor, with an estimated annual energy consumption of
180–240 kWh/m2 (BPIE, 2012).
Romania has focused on apartment building energy
retrofit since 2002 under the National Programme for
the Thermal Rehabilitation of Apartment Buildings. Its
aim is to reduce energy consumption to under
100 kWh/m2 mainly via thermal improvement, e.g.,
wall insulation, double-glazing and pipe insulation
(MDRAP, 2010). It has been estimated that the pro-
gramme can save up to 25% of total energy demand
for this type of housing, reduce heating bills by 40%
and CO2 emissions by 30–40% (MDRAP, 2010; Rotariu,
2012).
Costs were initially covered under a 33:33:33 regime,
i.e., national government, municipalities and apartment
owners paying one-third each (GEO 174/2002). This,
however, changed in 2010 to a 50:30:20 regime (OUG
nr. 18/2009), i.e., half being paid for by the national gov-
ernment, 30% by municipalities and 20% by apartment
owners, with flexibility at the municipal level to cover
the residents’ share fully or partially. In 2012, another
change occurred, this time encouraging municipalities
to take state-backed loans, but also including single-
family housing in the programme (OUG 63/2012).
From the 80,000 apartment buildings in Romania in
need of energy retrofit, with a total of 3 m apartments
(Pasztor & Peter, 2009), only 144,000 apartments
(4.8%) had been retrofitted by 2015 (Vrabie, 2015). Per-
formance is patchy and little documented at the munici-
pal level, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that
performance varies significantly across the country.
Cities such as Bucharest, Brasov, Cluj-Napoca, Timi-
soara and Arad are seen to be at the forefront of energy
retrofit action, while the rest of the country lags behind
(Vrabie, 2014).
Methods and data collection
Bucharest is a good case to investigate for a number of
reasons. It is the largest capital city in the CEE with
approximately 1.7 million residents and it holds the lar-
gest number of apartment buildings as a share of its
housing stock (70%) among CEE capital cities, compared
with the lowest in Sofia (Bulgaria) at 45% (UNECE,
2013). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that variation
in the delivery of retrofit occurs at the municipal level
and, thus, a closer look at its six municipalities can test
this assumption and explain some of this variation.5
The approach of using one city case departs radically
for the more recent trend towards multi-city studies,
which are based on the premise, recently challenged by
McCann and Ward (2011), that what works in one con-
text can be readily transferred to another. This study’s
focus on one city has allowed for more detailed probing
that would have otherwise been possible and advocates
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the importance of local context and conditions which
yield deeper insights into the complexity of the urban
energy problematic, more specifically, and urban sus-
tainability, more generally (Turcu, 2012; Turcu, Rydin,
& Pilkey, 2014).
Two methods of data collection were employed in
researching Bucharest: secondary analysis of census
data, municipal statistics and the grey literature; and
semi-structured interviews. National Institute of Stat-
istics (2011) data (http://statistici.insse.ro/shop/) were
used to extract information at the city and national levels
on housing stock tenure, age, typology; population; and
densities. The author has also accessed the ministerial
statistical information on public budgets and funding
and allocation, and numbers of retrofitted apartment
buildings. Data were relatively complete for 2009 and
2010 but incomplete for the following years; census
data were not available at the municipal level in Buchar-
est. To source some of this missing data, the author used
municipal documents and information from interviews.
Municipal public reports and websites were employed
to collect information on local budgets, expenditure per
municipality and allocated to energy retrofit; the total
and retrofitted number of apartment buildings; and the
political affiliation and longevity of the mayor in
power. Public information was not available at the
municipal level on a number of topics, which could
have enhanced a fuller understanding, including: average
income per inhabitant; a breakdown of the housing stock
and apartment buildings earmarked for energy retrofit
by tenure, age, size and energy performance; and the
number and size of resident associations.
Moreover, municipal strategy documents were ana-
lyzed to understand leadership for energy retrofit at the
municipal level, which is defined here as the mayor’s
support (i.e., mayoral political manifestos, public state-
ments) and how high on the list of municipal priorities
retrofit was ranked. Most of the data collected are from
2009 to 2010 (ministerial statistics) and 2014 (municipal
statistics). Not all municipalities have had previous to
2014 or up-to-date 2015 data on their websites during
data collection; and little data have been available for
S5 which, at the time of writing, was battling with the
national government over making public its municipal
budgets and strategies.
The secondary analysis was complemented by 20
semi-structured interviews with key players involved in
the energy retrofit of apartment buildings in Bucharest,
between December 2014 and January 2015. Interviewees
included municipal officers responsible for energy retro-
fit (S2, S4, S6) and one officer from City Hall (SG),
energy auditors (AAEC, UTCB01, UTCB02), building
research and higher education institutions (INCERC,
ICEMENERG, UAUIM01, UAUIM02), civil society
groups (ATU, LHR), construction firms (PBG, IPCT),
and representatives of condominium associations (RS1,
RS2, RS4, RS6) (Table 1).
Although it was relatively easy to identify intervie-
wees, interviewing them was challenging and time-con-
suming. People were reticent at first and would agree
to an interview following a friend’s recommendation.
Only two interviewees agreed to be recorded and on a
number of occasions comments were offered ‘off the
record’. Thus, this study relies on the researcher’s
notes, taken in Romanian during the interview and
translated in English thereafter. Drafts of this paper
were circulated to all interviewees, but only three
(ATU, AAEC, SG) gave feedback. Most difficult to inter-
view were the municipalities; in fact, three out of the six
municipalities (S1, S3, S5) declined to participate in the
study.
Interviews were semi-structured and conducted face
to face. Some interviewees were ‘short and to the
point’; others elaborated on at length; interviews lasted
between 45 min and two hours. The interview question-
naire consisted of 50 questions, structured in eight sec-
tions, as follows: general information (timelines, related
initiatives); statistics and mapping (numbers, typology,
maps); funding (local budgets, access to/distribution of
finance); costs (operational regimes; cost/m2); contract-
ing and public procurement (process, partnerships and
contracts); performance (local monitoring); institutions
(type of actors and relations; synergies and tensions; pat-
terns of work; resources; training and skills); and trust
(trust within the interviewee’s institution; trust between
different actors; sanctions). In addition, the municipali-
ties were asked via e-mail in December 2015 to
Table 1. Characteristics of the interviewees.
Interviewee type Code Total
Municipality S2, S4, S6, SG 4
Energy auditor AAEC (Association of Energy Auditors)





INCERC (National Institute for Building
Research)
ICEMENERG (National Institute for
Energy Research)
UAUIM01, UAUIM02 (University of




ATU (Association for Urban Transition)




PBG (Bucharest Project Group)
IPCT (Institute for Design of Standardized
Buildings)
2




supplement missing information (from secondary analy-
sis) on local strategy and priorities, and mayoral leader-
ship for energy retrofit.
The possible limitations of this study include the rela-
tively small sample of interviewees and restricted access
to municipal-level data. With only 20 interviews and one
city, it is difficult to make generalizations about other
municipalities in Romania or other cities in the CEE.
However, the findings here draw an accurate picture
for energy retrofit performance in Bucharest. Moreover,
previous studies suggested that a CEE city can have more
in common with its counterparts elsewhere in the CEE
than its next-door national neighbours (Lankina et al.,
2008). Thus, it is hoped that this study is of relevance
to energy retrofit in other cities, and to other countries
in the CEE.
Key findings
Institutions of energy retrofit: from ‘handlers’
to ‘non-governmentals’
Three types of institutions stand out at first in relation to
the energy retrofit of apartment buildings in Romania:
two ‘hard’ institutions: the Ministry of Regional Devel-
opment and Public Administration (MDRAP) and
municipalities (S1–S6); and one ‘soft’ institution: the
condominium associations. Their roles and interaction
seem straightforward: the MDRAP ‘sets the tone’ and
approves annual budgets; municipalities manage the
programme and link with condominium associations;
and condominium associations secure agreement
among residents and register with the programme.
This draws a picture of a centrally steered and linear
process, drawing on top-down guidance and legislation
from central government to municipalities, and some
collaboration at the local level between municipalities
and condominium associations. It also portrays two
families of institutions: formal-hard institutions at the
government level and formal-soft institutions at the
building level. Interviews in Bucharest, however, have
identified six types of institutional groups/families:
‘handlers’, ‘controllers’, ‘clients’, ‘intelligence gatherers’,
‘deliverers’ and ‘non-governmentals’ (Figure 1).
‘Handlers’
Municipalities are the programme’s ‘handlers’. They are
hard institutions and occupy a central role in the delivery
of energy retrofit; directly interact with the other insti-
tutional groups/families; and their role is clearly defined
by current policy documents and legislation (MDRAP,
2010, 2013; MDRT, 2012). There is no platform for
interaction or mechanism for knowledge transfer
between Bucharest’s six municipalities. Municipalities
manage energy retrofit on a daily basis; finance and/or
secure funding; appoint auditors, designers and con-
structors; connect with condominium associations; and
provide data for monitoring purposes. Furthermore,
since 2012, S1, S2 and S6 have financed the residents’
share, while S3 has taken a more progressive approach
by weighting its contribution in relation to residents’
income (see the following section).
In theory, the cost should be covered 50/30/20 from
national, local and resident shares. However, most resi-
dents cannot afford to cover their share and so, our
municipality has decided to step in and cover their
part. The programme is now covered 50/50 by national
and municipal funds. (S1)
‘Controllers’
‘Controllers’ are hard institutions that enact control via
finance, monitoring and special permits. They arbitrate
funding (EU, EBI andMDRAP) and energy performance
monitoring (MDRAP and INCERC), but also issue
special permits for buildings located in areas of historic
value or high seismic risk (City Hall).
We have to keep a close relation with MDRAP, mainly
for funding reasons, but also, they ask for data and
information about the programme and we have to com-
ply with their requirements if we want to stay in the
game. However, with the City Hall, we do not work
very closely; we only need them when there is a need
to work in heritage or seismic areas; that means that if
we need to thermally rehabilitate a building which is
already on their lists, we cannot touch that building
without their permission. (S6)
‘Clients’
Condominium associations are the programme’s ‘cli-
ents’. They are soft institutions and represent apartment
owners in a building. There are an estimated 12,000 con-
dominium associations in Bucharest (http://www.fapr.
ro/); however, there is no information about their size
or distribution by municipality. The condominium
association appoints an administrator who manages its
day-to-day affairs such as rent collection and utility pay-
ments. Administrators can be one resident from the
building or a ‘professional administrator’ who manages
a portfolio of buildings. Condominium associations
managed by the latter and/or larger were seen as being
more powerful, i.e., having a ‘bigger voice with the muni-
cipality’ and more resources. For example, one such con-
dominium association employed a secretary, accountant,
financial adviser and administrator. However, smaller
condominium associations with an ‘in-house’ adminis-
trator were seen as having their advantages, too – e.g.,
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they reached resident agreements faster and guaranteed
the administrator’s personal attention and involvement
during construction works. However, condominium
associations were little consulted and/or aware of the
works planned for their building.
From what I’ve heard on TV, the works include the roof
terrace insulation, basement insulation, double glazing,
changing entrance doors and closing off of balconies. I
hope this is what we are going to have, because these
will solve many problems and this is what we used to
convince our residents. I am not sure, though. … How-
ever, we heard about problems with some works, for
example in Rahova. They’ve shown it on TV. (RS4)
‘Intelligence gatherers’
The ‘intelligence gatherers’ are hard institutions such as
HE institutions (UTCB, UAUIM), research organiz-
ations (IPCT, INCERC, ICEMENERG and PBG) and
professional associations (AAEC). They play a role in
energy auditing, design and building specification, and
are formally appointed by municipalities. They can also
deliver the works, especially in the case of large
organizations such as the PBG and IPCT which have a
range of in-house expertise in design, engineering and
construction.
The municipalities work with different experts. On the
one hand, the designer/engineer and, on the other
hand, the auditor. The latter, however, does not do
just auditing; they usually hold other positions, too.
For example, some can be at the same time municipal
employees and auditors and/or designers and/or devel-
opers. (UTCB01)
‘Deliverers’
The ‘deliverers’ are construction firms, hard institutions.
They deliver the works and are directly appointed by
municipalities, following a public tendering process. Con-
struction firms can vary in size and scope, i.e., they can be
big or small, undertake all work or subcontract some of it.
The winning firms are both big and small. There is a
technical document [‘caiet de sarcini’] on the basis of
which the contract is signed … Some firms come
with their sub-contractors, others don’t. There are also
associations of firms to deliver the works, as well as ‘sup-
porters’ of these firms, also big or small. We also work
with a Spanish firm. (S2)
Figure 1. Institutions for energy retrofit of apartment building in Bucharest, Romania.
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‘Non-governmentals’
The ‘non-governmentals’ are soft institutions such as
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other
civil society organizations. They can establish a common
space for dialogue between the agency and state and can
act as important agents for collective action. Their
activity can range from active collaboration, through
campaigning and lobbing residents needs and rights, to
pressuring the energy and housing agenda more widely.
The number of ‘non-governmentals’ involved in the
energy retrofit of apartment buildings in Bucharest is
limited and only two were identified and interviewed:
ATU, an urban think-tank; and LHR, an NGO con-
cerned with housing issues.
‘Outsiders’
There is, however, a seventh institutional group/family:
the ‘outsiders’. They form a group made of both soft
and hard institutions that do not have a direct inter-
action with the programme, but were associated with it
by interviewees. It includes other municipalities and con-
dominium associations in Romania and abroad; ‘intelli-
gence gatherers’ (UAUIM, Romanian Order of
Architects); and ‘non-governmentals’ (Federation of
Resident Associations Romania, Energy Cities Romania
and Covenant of Mayors Romania).
Explaining municipal performance in Bucharest
Bucharest consists of six municipalities (or ‘sectoare’),
numbered S1–S6, which have their own elected mayors.
The municipalities have an operational role and oversee
local affairs such as planning, development control,
energy retrofit, schools, waste management, public
realm and green space maintenance etc. Bucharest also
has a city hall with its own elected general mayor,
which oversees wider city affairs such as strategic plan-
ning, heritage conservation, transportation, water and
power management etc. Bucharest holds some 8000
apartment buildings in need of energy retrofit across
its six municipalities, 10% of this type of housing at the
country level (author’s primary data).
Municipal finance and funding
The biggest proportion of municipal income is allocated
by the national government as a share of local household
income and business GVA. To top that up, municipali-
ties can also raise council tax and other income coming
from selling of public land or public development. The
municipal budget is spent on various municipal duties
ranging from energy retrofit of apartment buildings, to
green space maintenance and social assistance. For
example, Figure 2 shows that in 2014, S1 and S2 allocated
significant shares of their income to energy retrofit (17%
and 25%, respectively) compared with S3 at 5%, S4 at 0%
and S6 at 7%.
There are, however, some important differences
between the six municipalities, which are summarized in
Table 2. S1 is the ‘wealthiest’ (defined as ‘municipal budget
per inhabitant in 2014’, i.e., 6170 RON/inhabitant), least
densely populated (3139 inhabitants/km2) and least
dense in terms of apartment buildings earmarked for
energy retrofit (18 buildings/km2). This is followed by
S2 and S6, both similar in terms of ‘wealth’ and population
density. Compared with S2, however, S6 has a much
higher density of apartment buildings to be energy retro-
fitted (56 compared with 35 buildings/km2 respectively).
S3, S4 and S6 have seen rapid mass construction of
large housing estates (Balta Alba, Drumul Taberei, Mili-
tari, Berceni) made entirely of apartment buildings to
support adjacent industries. In fact, they were trans-
formed from suburban locations into Bucharest’s new
urban quarters in less than two decades (Panaitescu,
2012). This, together with factors such as lack of energy
retrofit prioritization at the municipal level, discussed
below, might explain some of the weak performance of
these municipalities when compared with S1 and S2.
Moreover, S1 and S2 are located in the north of Buchar-
est in the path of the city’s natural urban growth, driven
by milder climatic conditions and natural beauty spots
such as lakes and forests; they were well developed
when plans for new urban quarters during 1950–89
were laid out and so are less appealing for fast mass pro-
duction of housing (Bouzarovski, 2014).
An estimated 2000 apartment buildings (25%) have
been rehabilitated to date across Bucharest’s six munici-
palities, compared with 5% at the national level (Vrabie,
2014). Bucharest has its own customized funding regime
for the energy retrofit, a variation of the 50:30:20 regime
at the national level (Table 3). Only two (S4, S5) out of
the six municipalities use 50:30:20 regimes. In S1, S2
and S6 a 50:50:0 regime is applied, with the mayor’s
strong support in S1 and S2. S3 has a higher national
contribution (60%), but it applies a more ‘progressive’
model for the remaining 40% whereby the ‘wealthier’ is
the condominium association, the less money the muni-
cipality will contribute.6
In addition, Table 4 shows that Bucharest had
received (for its 10% share of apartment building
stock) almost half the funding available at the national
level in 2009–10, an estimated €51.1 million out of the
total of €115 m spent by Romania (BPIE, 2014). This
indicates an unbalanced allocation of energy retrofit
funding at the national level. Moreover, variation exists
in the 2009–10 funding allocation across the six munici-
palities, with, once more, S1 and S2 claiming the most
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and being allocated a quarter each (26% and 27%) over
the 2009–10 period.
Politics: party affiliation, mayor continuity and
leadership
Romania has a multi-party system that dwindles between
a centre-left and a centre-right orientation. At the
moment, the following parties are present: Social Demo-
cratic Party (PSD), seen as a far left party of ‘old-timers’;
four centre-right/far-right historic parties: National Lib-
eral Party (PNL), Conservative Party (PC), Democratic
Party (PD) and Democratic Union of Hungarians in
Romania (UDMR); and two newer parties, mainly con-
stituted from fractions of the parties above: Liberal
Democrat Party (PDL), fractions of PD and PNL since
2007; and National Union for the Progress of Romania
(UNPR), fractions of PSD and PNL, since 2010.
Table 5 describes the relation between public funding
received by each municipality in 2009–10 and their
mayor’s continuity and political affiliation between
2004 and 2016, compared with Bucharest and Romania.
It does not support a clear link between the amount of
public funding received by each municipality and a
‘match’ between municipal mayors’ political affiliation
and the country’s political majority. Both S1 and S2
received the biggest shares of funding in 2009–10, but
they were not associated with the party in power in
Romania at the time. Table 5 also shows that all munici-
palities benefited mayor continuity in 2004–16 with one
exception, S6, which changed its mayor in 2012, which
Table 2. Main characteristics of Bucharest’s six municipalities (S1–S6).
Municipal characteristics S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Bucharest
Population (number of inhabitants)a 194,608 304,523 342,541 261,306 241,585 333,422 1,677,985
Area (km2)a 62 32 32 34 30 38 228
Population density (inhabitants/km2) 3,139 9,516 10,704 7,685 8,053 8,774 7,359
Municipal budget 2014 (million RON)b 1,200 892 683 644 n.a. 993 n.a.
Municipal budget per inhabitant in 2014 (RON/
inhabitant)
6,170 2,960 1,990 2,470 n.a. 2,980 n.a.
Number of apartment buildings earmarked for
thermal rehabilitationb
1,100 1,110 1,425 1,600 1,023 2,114 8,372
Density of apartment buildings earmarked for
energy retrofit (buildings/km2)
18 35 45 47 34 56 37
Very large apartment building estates built in
1965–84 (number of apartments)c








bInformation collated by the author from individual municipal websites.
cPanaitescu (2012); RON is the Romanian currency – ‘ROmanian New leu’.
Figure 2.Municipal expenditure per sector across Bucharest’s six municipalities in 2014 (as a percentage of the total municipal budget).
Source: Information collected by the author from individual municipal budgets; no data available for S5.
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might explain the municipality’s slower progress and drive
on energy retrofit. However, one cannot argue that vari-
ation in municipal performance on energy retrofit can
be explained by a lack of continuity in mayoral leadership.
Table 6, in turn, looks at wider municipal leadership
for energy retrofit, defined here as mayor’s support for
energy retrofit via political manifestos and public state-
ments, and the prioritization of energy retrofit at the
municipal strategy level. It shows that some municipali-
ties, alongside their mayors, place a greater emphasis on
energy retrofit than others. It is first in a list of five pri-
orities in S1 and strongly supported by a mayor’s public
statement. It is also a priority in S2:
Priorities are decided at the municipal level and on the
basis of priorities agreed during the electoral campaign.
Rehabilitation has been one of our Mayor’s priorities
and it has stayed as such during his mandate. He has
a ‘masterplan’ which establishes short-, medium- and
long-term priorities. All political forces support this
programme; there is agreement within our municipality.
(S2)
However, energy retrofit does not seem to be ranked very
highly amongmunicipal priorities in the other four muni-
cipalities, despite being acknowledged on their websites as
an important area of action. It is ranked third out of five
in S3, not a top-three priority in S4, not mentioned at all
in S5, and ranked 13th out of 14 in S6.
Institutional interaction, trust and collective action
The ‘handlers’ (municipalities) are at the centre of infor-
mal interaction between the various institutions of retro-
fit. This is, however, a one-way interaction, from
municipalities to the other institutions. For example,
condominium associations do not play an active role in
shaping the retrofit action and have no formal mechan-
ism of interaction with any other institution but the
municipality; they do not even have a say in the selection
of contractors or building works reception/audit.
Some formal interaction exists, however, between
municipalities, ‘intelligence gatherers’ and construction
firms. This is established via legal agreements and con-
tracts but also emerging informal partnerships, as muni-
cipalities prefer to work with the same ‘intelligence
gatherers’. Despite ‘knowing’ each other, however, ‘intel-
ligence gatherers’ do not interact with each other and
compete for resources.
We have only worked with X municipality and Y muni-
cipality so far; the whole procedure is transparent and
we work well together. That’s why, I think, they keep
coming back to us. (AAEC)
Table 3. Bucharest’s six municipalities: total and retrofitted by 2014 apartment buildings; municipal budged and percentage budget
















S1 628 1,100 57% 1,200 m RON 1.1 50:50:0
S2 511 1,110 46% 892 m RON 0.8 50:50:0
S3 309 1,425 21% 683 m RON 0.5 60:30:10 (< €150)
60:20:20 (< €350)
60:10:30 (< €500)
S4 117 1,600 7% 477 m RON 0.3 50:30:20
S5 215 1,023a 21% n.a. n.a. 50:30:20
S6 244 2,114 11% 993 0.5 50:50:0
Bucharest 2,024 8,372c 25% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes:
aNo statistics were available for S5; the current value was calculated by deducting from Bucharest’s total.
bBudgets were compiled by the author from each individual municipality website.
cIvanov (2015).
Source: Compiled by the author from Ungureanu (2014) and Vrabie (2014).
Table 4. National funding by municipality in Bucharest, 2009–10






S1 €13.3 million (59,209,473
RON)
26%
S2 €14 million (62,944,320
RON)
27%
S3 €5 million (21,291,768
RON)
9.8%
S4 €1.3 million (6,001,099
RON)
2.5%
S5 €7.7 million (33,999,541
RON)
15.6%







Sources: Author’s secondary analysis of primary data from MDRAP lists from
2008 to 2010 (MDRAP, 2009, 2010a, 2010b).
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Construction firms also have direct and strong inter-
action with the municipality and with ‘intelligence gath-
erers’ when their roles overlap, but have no formal
channel for interaction with condominium associations
to which works are delivered. Concerns have also been
voiced about wider lack of interaction between the var-
ious institutions of energy retrofit.
There is a generalised lack of dialogue between us – one
could work more across Bucharest’s six municipalities,
with other cities in Romania or abroad or other inter-
ested parties, but there is no interest to do that! Also,
there are cities in Romania that are better at thermal
rehabilitation than Bucharest, for example Brasov,
Alba Iulia, Topoloveni, Mioveni – some, fully done! In
the end, all is down to how interested and connected
is the Mayor. (ICEMENERG)
It is argued that the interaction between formal
and informal institutions is facilitated by trust in insti-
tutions, i.e., the more trust in institutions, the better the
interaction (Raiser et al., 2001). Interviews revealed rela-
tively good levels of trust within individual institutions,
but not within and between institutional families.
We all compete for the same resources. If their building
is done, the municipality might not have the money to
do ours. Also, I am not sure who they know and what
connections they have which might put them at an
advantage. It is always best to keep yourself to yourself.
(RS1)
In other words, membership to an institutional group/
family does not carry ‘default’ trust among the members
of that institutional group/family. Institutional group/
family members trust in isolation and are divided by
trust from other members in their institutional group/
family, but also other institutional groups/families.
‘Default’ trust was found between three pairings of
hard institutions, enforced via legal agreements: ‘hand-
lers’ and ‘clients’; ‘handlers’ and ‘intelligence gatherer’;
and ‘handlers’ and ‘deliverers’. However, that did not
pave the way for mutual exchanges of knowledge or
‘favours’ between these institutions.
I don’t like contributing ideas and advice for free – we
are forbidden to do that! People either steal them and
go on to make money, or blame us if something goes
wrong. I like to have my back covered and so, I follow
the books and only get involved under contractual
agreements. (PBG)
‘Calling on favours’ was generally associated with insti-
tutional corruption and people were weary of talking
about it. When asked whether any kind of reciprocal
exchange or favour helped or can be of help in the deliv-
ery of energy retrofit in one municipality, the interviewee
answered:
Favours? What favours? Miss, we don’t have this type of
‘ballet’ here! We would have the EU accusing us of cor-
ruption in no time! We follow what is written and
approved and don’t ask for favors! … and after a
moment of silence, he added. … However, it would
be good to call on favours from time to time.… At
least in that way, one could hope that something
might come his way one day … . (S4)
Little evidence of collective action was found at the level
of soft institutions of energy retrofit: ‘clients’ and ‘non-
Table 5. Bucharest’s municipalities: percentage of national funding 2009–10 (under a 50:30:20 regime); mayor’s continuity and political
affiliation 2004–16, compared with Bucharest and Romania.
Municipality
Percentage of total funding
allocation (in 2009 and 2010)
Major/political affiliation
2004–08 2008–12 2012–16










































Romania 200% PNL + PDL PDL + UNPR + UDMR PSD + PNL + PC (May–December 2012)
PSD + UNPR + PNL + PC (2012–14)
PSD + UNPR + PC + UDMR (2014–15)
Apolitical/technocrat (2015–present)
Note: aSuspended in 2015 and investigated for corruption in relation to ‘favouritism’ in public procurement and pocketing 10% commission.
Source: Individual municipal websites.
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governamentals’. Condominium associations had a pas-
sive role, while the two NGOs interviewed were only
indirectly involved and had a rather negative view
about the programme:
The programme is more about ‘image’ than reducing
energy consumption. It is a lot of ‘green washing’!
This programme is like a ‘gift from your municipality’,
the residents do not have to give or do anything in
return … and this, of course, leads to low levels of
involvement and responsibility on the resident side.
(ATU)
This can be seen as an indication of little interaction
between hard and soft institutions of energy retrofit
and so, problematic institutional design and poor
urban governance.
Moreover, nobody seemed willing to engage ‘for free’.
‘Handlers’ pursued targets and electoral leverage, ‘clients’
free improvements to their homes, ‘intelligence gath-
erers’ paid fees and ‘deliverers’ profit margins. Even
‘non-governmentals’ seemed generally to be disinter-
ested to engage with the programme at no cost.
In principle, the Order of the Romanian Architects
(OAR) has called itself ‘a disinterested player’ in the
name of architectural aesthetics and a coherent style
for Bucharest. However, some are of a different opinion
because OAR wants to get involved as a ‘paid advisor’!
As regarding other organizations like NGOs … of
course they have to be paid! Nothing is for free in this
country! (LHR)
Conclusions
Following from the above discussion and the initial ques-
tions raised at the beginning of this paper, three answers
are put forward. First, the institutional complexity of
energy retrofit of apartment building in Bucharest is sig-
nificantly underestimated. The formal institutional land-
scape is dominated by hard institutions, which is
characterized by weak interactions (1) between formal
and informal institutions (where limited trust is seen as
a main explanation); and (2) between hard and soft insti-
tutions (where lack of collective action is seen as a main
cause). Second, spatial disparities were found to exist in
the distribution of Bucharest’s apartment buildings.
There is an uneven distribution of buildings in need of
renovation and the currently retrofitted buildings.
There is also uneven spatial distribution of public sub-
sidy and municipal investment for retrofit. Third, the
spatial disparities accompany the variation in the energy
retrofit performance at the municipal level. This can be
explained by a combination of factors including munici-
pal leadership (i.e., mayor’s support and municipal
prioritization), ‘wealth’ (i.e., municipal budget per
inhabitant and energy retrofit spending), and public sub-
sidy, and, potentially, characteristics of the housing stock
such as typology, size and layout.
Institutional complexity
In a broad sense, institutions can be understood and
classified along formal–informal and hard–soft lines of
Table 6. Wider municipal leadership for energy retrofit across
Bucharest’s six municipalities as a priority in the municipal




S1 First of six 1. Thermal rehabilitation
2. Building of social housing
3. Urban regeneration
4. Culture and education
5. Tourism




S2 ‘[A] priority’ No municipal strategy available.
‘ … Rehabilitation has been one of
our Mayor’s priorities and it has
stayed as such during his
mandate … ’ (S2)
Yes (S2
interview)




5. Efficient administration (http://
www.primarie3.ro/)
Not clear
S4* Not in top
three
No municipal strategy available.
‘The programme for thermal
rehabilitation is part of the
municipal wider strategy and
most of the time a local priority.
However, local priorities are
decided by elected councillors on
the basis of electoral promises
which for S4 are: improvements to










S6 13th of 14 1. Green space






‘Our mayor has so many other
priorities and there are so many
other things to do in our
municipality, that the energy
retrofit of apartment buildings is
not a priority’ (S6)
No (S6
interview)
Source: Secondary analysis of publicly available individual municipal strat-
egies, complemented with data from the interviews.
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distinction. The focus here is on the informal institution
of trust, as the gel for interaction between formal and
informal institutions. Six types of formal institutions
were identified for their involvement in of apartment
building retrofits: four hard (i.e., ‘handlers’, ‘controllers’,
‘intelligence gatherers’ and ‘deliverers’) and two soft (i.e.,
‘clients’ and ‘non-governmentals’). However, only two
out of six institutions (‘handlers’ and ‘clients’) were
acknowledged in policy and legislative documents,
while four (‘controllers’, ‘intelligence gatherers’, ‘deli-
verers’ and ‘non-governamentals’) were not. This yields
a more complex and finely grained institutional land-
scape, with institutions that are active at all levels from
international, through national, city and municipality,
to building level. It also suggests a more bottom-up
and decentralized institutional landscape where retrofit
processes are shaped and delivered locally, rather than
from the top as currently portrayed by the literature.
Non-acknowledged institutions were left outside the
current national framing for energy retrofit and so
their roles and responsibilities were often unclear and/
or questionable. For example, some institutions wore
two hats (i.e., they could be both ‘intelligence gatherers’
and ‘deliverers’), which suggested a conflict of interests.
Moreover, tensions existed between various institutions
such as, for example, between ‘clients’ and ‘delivers’
due to the fact the ‘clients’ did not have a say in the
choice of ‘deliverers’ and the quality of their work.
These aspects should be reconsidered in the future shap-
ing of energy retrofit policy and legislation in Romania,
but probably also in other CEE countries as well, as all
relevant institutions and stakeholders should play an
important role in the shaping and, thus, delivery of reno-
vation processes (Feige et al., 2011).
The interaction between formal and informal insti-
tutions was poor in Bucharest. This was determined by
little trust between institutional groups/families –
whereby, for example, ‘clients’ did not trust ‘deliverers’
– but also between the members of the same institutional
group/family – whereby one ‘intelligence gatherer’ did
not trust another ‘intelligence gatherer’. ‘Default’ trust
was an exception, guaranteed by the rule of law and
associated with an expectation of fair treatment (Miller
et al., 1997). Bucharest also revealed an imbalance
between hard and soft institutions, with the former over-
powering the latter; and lack of collective action, seen as
a cause of weak interaction between hard and soft insti-
tutions of energy retrofit (Healey et al., 2002).
The research confirms that poor institutional inter-
action between institutions leads to a lack of institutional
‘equilibrium’ (Platje, 2008) and ‘congruence’ (Lankina
et al., 2008) of energy retrofit; energy retrofit action
mainly takes place ‘outside people’s lives’ (Matthiesen,
2002) in Bucharest/Romania. This, in turn, impacts
negatively on the institutional design and good govern-
ance of energy retrofit processes and subsequently on
energy retrofit performance at the local level. This insti-
tutional interaction, however, needs further research to
understand better how it affects variation in municipal
performance.
Spatial disparities
Spatial variation in the municipal delivery of energy ret-
rofit of apartment buildings in Bucharest does exist. Fac-
tors associated with this variation (i.e., ‘percentage
retrofitted by 2014’ in Table 3) across Bucharest’s muni-
cipalities and high municipal performance in S1 and S2
were primarily political – municipal leadership (i.e.,
‘prioritization within municipal strategy’ and ‘mayor
support’ in Table 6) – and, to a certain extent, economic
– municipal ‘wealth’ (i.e., ‘budget per inhabitant’ in
Table 2), municipal spending (Table 3) and public sub-
sidy (Table 4). However, the high-performing municipa-
lities had a smaller stock of apartment buildings in need
of energy retrofit as a share of their total stock, no large
housing estates and better city locations historically
(Table 2). Thus, built environment factors such as the
typology, size, layout and location of this type of housing,
which were not examined in the current research, might
also influence variation in performance at the local level,
as well as explain poorer performance in S3–S6.
Bucharest was allocated 50% of energy retrofit public
funding in 2009–10 for its 10% share of apartment build-
ings at the national level. This indicates that ‘equaliza-
tion’ mechanisms did not work well in Romania
(Lankina et al., 2008). Capital cities in the CEE used to
be centres for economic, cultural and, most importantly,
political power under previous socialist regimes. Closely
associated with the party apparatchik, they consumed
large amounts of human and monetary resources and
enjoyed centre-stage attention. Bucharest, as perhaps
other CEE capital cities, seemed still to enjoy some of
its former primacy at the national level and claimed
most of the available public funding for energy retrofit
at the expense of other cities. This is significant as 90%
of Romania’s apartment building stock in need of retrofit
is outside Bucharest in areas of sometimes severe depri-
vation and disadvantage (Bouzarovski, 2014).
Inequality of energy retrofit
The current action for the retrofit of apartment buildings
in Bucharest did not reach municipalities with the high-
est need and potential. The findings uncovered an
unequal distribution of energy retrofit action across
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Bucharest’s municipalities, and suggested a similar
course of action at the national level, between Bucharest
and other cities in Romania. A combination of factors
(e.g., municipal leadership, wealth and retrofit spending,
and public subsidy) seems to progress retrofit perform-
ance for some municipalities at the expense of others.
At the same time, not all apartment buildings in one
municipality might need public subsidy or the same
level of public subsidy to undertake energy retrofit, i.e.,
the ‘ecological fallacy’ of urban programmes. Between-
and within-municipality unequal distribution of energy
retrofit action needs to be addressed by future housing
retrofit policy and initiatives in the CEE.
This, however, raises questions about the current
geography and ‘fairness’ of retrofit actions in the CEE
and highlights the existence of interrelated factors
which can place some municipalities and cities in a pos-
ition of disadvantage beyond their control. Current
debates in the CEE region focus on ‘how much’ and
‘how quickly’ the retrofit targets can be delivered rather
than on ‘where’ and ‘for whom’ these can be achieved.
This has implications for the wider European housing
retrofit agenda but also for national programmes in the
CEE, which should reflect and address existing imbal-
ances between cities and within cities for a fairer and
more efficient energy retrofit of apartment buildings.
The institutional and political framing of energy ret-
rofit of apartment buildings in the CEE has been less
addressed and little related to the wider agendas and
institutional framing of energy efficiency at the EU
level. It is well known that the CEE lacks institutional
capital and that institutional interaction is weak as a
result of limited trust and collective action. However,
this needs a better understanding. The case of Bucharest
showed that municipalities can employ multiple models
for institutionalizing and governing energy retrofit, with
a potential for more decentralized roles and responsibil-
ities. Soft institutions are important as pressure groups to
‘control’ hard institutions but also to influence municipal
leadership and political commitment to energy retrofit.
This can build more institutional capital for retrofit
which, in turn, can mediate conflicts between specific
urban policies such as retrofit and other local social,
economic and environmental priorities at the municipal
level.
Finally, two further observations should be made.
First, tensions can surface between the role of municipa-
lities and that of other institutions involved in the deliv-
ery of retrofit. This means that the ‘centrality’ of the
municipality in delivering energy retrofit in the CEE
imposed via legislation and access to funding can be pro-
blematic, and it has been argued in relation to other areas
of energy efficiency in buildings that it can lead to an
‘inadequate functioning’ of municipalities in relation to
these policy areas (Poputoaia & Bouzarovski, 2010).
Second, the current energy performance targets for
energy retrofit of apartment buildings aim for annual
consumptions of 100 kWh/m2, which are not overly
ambitious when compared with passive house standards
of 15 kWh/m2. Thus, the current retrofit action in the
CEE only achieves a smaller proportion of the potential
for energy saving that buildings hold (Bouzarovski, 2015;
IIASA, 2012).
Notes
1. CEE refers to the following eleven EU-28 countries:
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slove-
nia. This classification is used by the Building Perform-
ance European Institute (BPEI) and is based on ‘the
climatic, building typology and market similarities’ of
the region (BPIE, 2011, p. 8).
2. Building retrofit does not have a consistent definition. A
full building retrofit approach refers to energy, water
and waste systems in buildings. It can involve light or
deep measures, ranging from double-glazing to a
‘whole building’ approach. At present, apartment build-
ing retrofit in the CEE does not address a building’s
water and waste systems and focuses on improving its
energy performance via measures such as wall, loft,
roof and basement insolation; windows and door air
tightening; double-glazing etc.; and sometimes heating
system optimization. This type of energy-led retrofit
comes under names such as ‘retrofit’, ‘thermal efficiency
retrofit’, ‘thermal improvement’, ‘thermal renovation’ or
‘thermal rehabilitation’. This paper will use the term
‘energy retrofit’ due to its main focus on improving
energy performance.
3. Apartment building housing is the equivalent of condo-
minium housing, housing in multi-occupation which
consists of groupings of individual households owning
an apartment each in a shared building. Condominium
housing is different from cooperative housing (which
builds and administers housing for their members)
and housing associations (which build and/or adminis-
ter social housing).
4. Local urban performance is defined in the literature
mainly in relation to a city’s economic performance;
however, this paper takes a broader view and defines it
as a city’s/municipality’s ability to achieve urban policy
goals.
5. The author has worked and conducted research in
Bucharest and speaks Romanian. This has helped with
data collection and access to information, but also has
added a richer and longitudinal understanding of the
urban problematic.
6. The municipality pays 30% and the condominium associ-
ation 10% if 50% plus one residents have a monthly
household income < €150 per household member; the
municipality pays 20% and the condominium association
20% if 50% plus one residents have a monthly household
income < €350 per household member; and the
BUILDING RESEARCH & INFORMATION 15
municipality pays 10% and the condominium association
30% if 50% plus one residents have a monthly income <
€500 per household member.
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